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I.
JURISDICTION
There does not appear to be any issue that jurisdiction is proper and
appropriate before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (195'

•
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Then

(actual issues in dispute whether presented as

statements of the case or the facts. The parties agree to the facls as ,< l h HHi ni
Appellant's brief with the additional provisions set forth in Appellee's brief and as
both parties ajjree Hie sei loitti in the record by stipulated facts in the hearing of
January 13th, 2003, see hearing transcript of that diy .ii i>.iq<»s ;H 't3 lid urn 167.
Moreover, the State does not dispute preservation of the issue for appeal.
Page 1 of
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III.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. 1
ALLOWING ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE WITHOUT CERTIFYING THE
OPERATOR INVITES AN ATTACK UPON THE ESTABLISHED STANDARDS
FOR ADMINISTRATION AND INTERPRETATION OF CHEMICAL ANALYSIS
AS PROVIDED THROUGH THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
The arguments presented by Appellee at first blush appear reasonable.
Surely this case can be no different than the circumstances in Salt Lake City v.
Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1993) where the officer failed to complete a
separate checklist after a third breath test or retain the results of the two (2) prior
failed tests. The omission violated the standards set by the Department of Public
Safety. The difference is that in the Emerson case the officer was certified and the
issue for review involved the proper use of the Intoxilizer 5000. Expert testimony in
that case was helpful and the manner of noncompliance was one not likely to be
exploited. Retracing the steps of the officer in his procedure and assessing whether
or not that procedure was adequately followed as measured by the response of the
machine was sensible and reliable to determine whether the machine was
functioning properly or the procedure followed correctly. The problem in applying that
approach to the certification of officers is that it rewards the misconduct of the officer
in not maintaining certification, subjects the procedure to exploitation of
Page 2 of
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noncompliance and undermines the regulatory scheme contemplated by statute, rule
and the Department of Public Safety. Once an officer has completed his initial
training, been certified and operated the instrument in question for the first period of
certification, he will unquestionably have all of the education, experience and training
necessary to be established as an expert for trial purposes in any DUI case as
assessed by the criteria of the Utah Rules of Evidence under Rule 702. The officer
would be qualified to render his or her opinion both as to operation of the Intoxilizer
5000 and the results. If the Court recognizes such qualification by experience
without certification, it is reasonable to assume that such an alternative would be
exploited by officers at the time of their recertification in nearly every district court
in the State, and the renewal provisions will no longer be viewed as necessary. In
fact, it only follows that the more time an officer has properly operated the Intoxilizer
5000 the more likely it is that he will be recognized as an expert by his experience
in the field and proportionately it will be of diminishing significance whether the
officer was ever recertified. In fact, by implementing the procedure considered by
the State one effectively eliminates the need for renewal certification eventhough it
is found to be a fundamental part of subsection D of R 714-500-6. What need is
there to renew certification when one can presume that a Utah district court will
recognize expertise as an admissible alternative to render an opinion upon the
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proper operation or use of the intoxilizer? It is even more disconcerting when one
considers the fact that in the instant case the so called expert testimony was elicited
from the one not certified, leading one to question why the trial court did not find the
testimony unreliable because it was so self serving. In fact, the Court surprisingly
saw no significant credibility concern in the officer's testimony even though the
evidence at hearing established the same officer had lied about the issue of not
being certified at a previous hearing.
The experience-trumpts-certification argument could be applied to one driving
without a driver's license, practicing law or some other profession without a license
or even handling food in a restaurant without a food handler's permit. Certainly,
experience under any of those circumstances would be just as reliable for
admissibility purposes.

The statutory mandate to the Commissioner of the

Department of Public Safety was to establish and administer uniform and reliable
standards and these have been promulgated into the form adopted as Rule 714 500-6. Subsection A states clearly that all breath alcohol testing operators ... must
be certified by the department. The language "unless the operator qualifies as an
expert under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence" or its contextual equivalent is no
where to be found within the section. Allowing an exception to this part of the
process undermines the regulatory scheme requiring certification and recertification.
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Given the circumstance, the language found in Fuenninq v. Arizona. 680 P.2d
121 (Aa 1983) by the Arizona Supreme Court seems prophetic in stating "nothing
would defeat the legislative objective more rapidly than to permit the various
jurisdictions in Arizona to go their own way, secure in the knowledge that a test
made under a particular procedure would be admissible so long as they show the
accuracy and reliability of their local methodology, notwithstanding that a different,
accurate and reliable procedure used in the adjoining town would have produced a
different result in an otherwise identical situation." Id at page 133.
The Arizona Supreme Court saw the matter as one of uniform minimum
standards and read their provisions pari materia. It viewed the practice of utilizing
alternatives to the established standards as prospectively too risky, leading to the
possibility of finding one guilty in one case but innocent in another based upon
varying standards, practices, operations or procedures. The Utah courts should be
no less vigilant in establishing uniform objective minimum standards and not
allowing exception that would defeat the purpose of the regulatory scheme. Applying
an alternative means of admissibility under the Rules of Evidence by an uncertified
operator substantially reduces the conforming basis of inherent reliability upon which
the standard is predicated.
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POINT NO. 2
EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO ADOPT ALTERNATIVE RELIABILITY
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EVIDENCE. THAT SIMPLY NO
PRESUMPTION AROSE FOR LACK OF COMPLYING WITH STATUTORY
PROCEDURE. THE POSITION SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO APPLY TO
THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF OFFICERS.
The Appellant believes that the application of Rule 702, Utah Rules of
Evidence, may be an appropriate alternative for admitting evidence in similar
circumstances where the evidence would otherwise be found to not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 714-500-5 and 6 regarding scientific testing if the same is
helpful to the trier of fact, reliable by objective standards and not subject to
exploitation. Certainly, when the issue is one of whether or not the instrument is
functioning properly, expert testimony could be helpful to establish its proper
operation, use and function.
The cases cited by Appellee show circumstances where the application of an
alternative admissibility exception would not undermine the regulatory scheme. In
State v. Garcia. 965 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1998), the circumstances were very much
like those of State v. Emerson, in that they both involved situations where the
operating officer performed the testing procedure correctly but recorded the results
incorrectly. In Murrav City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), the issue of
trustworthiness was directed toward the machine. Officer certification was a given
Page 6 of
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assumption in the assessment of each of those cases. In State v. Rimmasch, 775
P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), the issue concerned expertise in a different field, child
psychology and behavior, which Appellant views as being a different matter but still
finds it hard to assume that certification or its equivalent, licensing in the discipline,
would not have been scrutinized severely for admissibility purposes no matter what
experience a particular child psychologist may have had. Moreover, as to the issue
of inherent reliability, the Appellant feels that any assessment made by the trial court
should be suspect in determining adequate foundation; that is, the proper application
of scientific principles or techniques to the facts of this case by one qualified. See
footnote 7, at page 398. However, to apply this position to include certification would
only serve to undermine the entire established process and calls into question the
fundamental purpose of the statutory scheme. If the testing results are to be treated
as reliable and the testing procedures acceptable, there must be no exception to the
certification process of those operating the equipment, see State v. Bishop. 957 P.2d
369 (Kansas, 1998). There is no compelling reason in this case to deviate from that
important uniform minimum standard.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above and in Appellant's brief,
he requests that the matter be reversed and that Appellant's motion to suppress be
granted and such other and further relief as appears equitable and proper.
DATED thi&3fi&

day of

H ^

20 0 5 .

#

J. BRYANTACKSON,
Attorney for Appellant Keith
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